sageox@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Complete toolkit for SageOx team knowledge. Query team context, manage AI coworkers, distill and summarize activity, see what coworkers are working on, catch..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher avi-ox-agola · publishing for 199 daysInstalls 748Last detonated 27 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 3: error: jq is required
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
0.1sprocessexited 2: usage: select-new-entries.sh <team_id> <since> <state_file>
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: ox install state not configured — run install flow from references/setup.md
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
0.1sprocessexited 2: usage: update-state.sh <state_file> <team_id>
0.1sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install-ox-curl.sh:7 · Remote installer piped to shell# Why this shape: scanners flag `curl | bash` of a remote shell script,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install-ox-curl.sh:151 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "fix: add this line to ~/.openclaw/.env (OpenClaw loads it into the skill subprocess):" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/update-ox.sh:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "fix: prepend \$HOME/.local/bin to PATH in ~/.openclaw/.env so the pinned install wins" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install-ox-curl.sh:125 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$dest"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install-ox-curl.sh:7 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# Why this shape: scanners flag `curl | bash` of a remote shell script,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-ox-curl.sh:8 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# and skills that sudo into system paths. This script avoids both. TheFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,348 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim avi-ox-agola: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim avi-ox-agolaPropose a patch to the maintainer