sageox@0.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Complete toolkit for SageOx team knowledge. Query team context, manage AI coworkers, distill and summarize activity, see what coworkers are working on, catch..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Why this shape: scanners flag `curl | bash` of a remote shell script,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo "fix: add this line to ~/.openclaw/.env (OpenClaw loads it into the skill subprocess):" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.echo "fix: prepend \$HOME/.local/bin to PATH in ~/.openclaw/.env so the pinned install wins" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x "$dest"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# Why this shape: scanners flag `curl | bash` of a remote shell script,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# and skills that sudo into system paths. This script avoids both. TheFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim avi-ox-agola: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.