Skills/ClawHub/project-orchestrator

project-orchestrator@0.2.0

BLOCKED· static only

Publisher claims: "AI agent orchestrator with Neo4j knowledge graph, Meilisearch search, and Tree-sitter parsing. Use for coordinating multiple coding agents on complex projects with shared context and plans." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher reversteam · publishing for 286 daysInstalls 3,652Last detonated 16 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 48/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/chat/prompt.rs:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Ne jamais commiter de fichiers sensibles (.env, credentials, secrets)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/bin/mcp_server.rs:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/chat/types.rs:259 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceinput: serde_json::json!({"command": "rm -rf /"}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/main.rs:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test.sh:102 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test.sh:169 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test.sh:141 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/chat/types.rs:259 · Destructive file system command detectedinput: serde_json::json!({"command": "rm -rf /"}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/events/notifier.rs:42 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif let Err(e) = client.post(&url).json(&event).send().await {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,062 tok
3 files · 90 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

32 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reversteam: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim reversteamPropose a patch to the maintainer