project-orchestrator@0.2.0
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "AI agent orchestrator with Neo4j knowledge graph, Meilisearch search, and Tree-sitter parsing. Use for coordinating multiple coding agents on complex projects with shared context and plans." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 48/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
- Ne jamais commiter de fichiers sensibles (.env, credentials, secrets)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Load .env if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.input: serde_json::json!({"command": "rm -rf /"}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Load .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.input: serde_json::json!({"command": "rm -rf /"}),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if let Err(e) = client.post(&url).json(&event).send().await {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
32 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reversteam: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.