macliner@0.2.2
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Cleans, updates and checks a Mac." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.2.1
vet-skills diff macliner 0.2.1 0.2.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
backups, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.config`, `~/.local`, the folders of AIFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.itself only probes `sudo -n true`, which never asks and changes nothing). Lines thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.need_admin.append("sudo rm -rf '%s'" % app)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/macliner/answers.json.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim geragarazagh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.