Skills/ClawHub/macliner

macliner@0.2.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Cleans, updates and checks a Mac." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher geragarazagh · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 70Last detonated 17 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.2.1

vet-skills diff macliner 0.2.1 0.2.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.config/macliner/answers.json · ~/Applications outside project
0.1sprocessexec /opt/homebrew/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /opt/homebrew/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:192 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesbackups, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.config`, `~/.local`, the folders of AIFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/macliner.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesitself only probes `sudo -n true`, which never asks and changes nothing). Lines thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/macliner.py:964 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesneed_admin.append("sudo rm -rf '%s'" % app)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,209 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/macliner/answers.json.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim geragarazagh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim geragarazaghPropose a patch to the maintainer