macliner@0.2.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Cleans, updates and checks a Mac in one run: a plan with sizes first, caches and leftovers deleted for real, a question before anything a person might want, then a second look to verify." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
p = subprocess.run(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.need_admin.append("sudo rm -rf '%s'" % app)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.backups, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.config`, `~/.local`, the folders of AIFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.itself only probes `sudo -n true`, which never asks and changes nothing). Lines thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/macliner/answers.json.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim geragarazagh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.