Skills/ClawHub/macliner

macliner@0.2.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Cleans, updates and checks a Mac in one run: a plan with sizes first, caches and leftovers deleted for real, a question before anything a person might want, then a second look to verify." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher geragarazagh · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 29 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.config/macliner/answers.json · ~/Applications outside project
0.1sprocessexec /opt/homebrew/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/lsappinfo
0.1sprocessexec /opt/homebrew/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/mdfind
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/mdfind
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/macliner.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/macliner.py:964 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesneed_admin.append("sudo rm -rf '%s'" % app)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:192 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesbackups, `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.config`, `~/.local`, the folders of AIFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesitself only probes `sudo -n true`, which never asks and changes nothing). Lines thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,209 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/macliner/answers.json.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim geragarazagh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim geragarazaghPropose a patch to the maintainer