Skills/ClawHub/listenhub

listenhub@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Explain anything — turn ideas into podcasts, explainer videos, or voice narration. Use when the user wants to "make a podcast", "create an explainer video",..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher boxingyi · publishing for 265 daysInstalls 2,807Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Fake instruction boundary tag; Host or command assembled from base64 fragments. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.0sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.3sprocessexited 1: 3. Run: source ~/.zshrc
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.3sprocessexited 1: Please run manually: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y jq
0.3sprocess8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/generate-image.sh:350 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringecho -n " Please paste your API key: " >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:492 · Fake instruction boundary tag</instructions>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsscripts/generate-image.sh:123 · Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsecho "$input" | openssl base64 -d > "$output" 2>/dev/nullFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-image.sh:285 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall_cmd="sudo dnf install -y ${missing_deps[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/lib.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsmv -f "$script_tmp" "$script" && chmod +x "$script"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:22 · Fake instruction boundary tag<instructions>Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/lib.sh:99 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho "│ Run: npx skills add marswaveai/skills │" >&2Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-image.sh:283 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall_cmd="sudo yum install -y ${missing_deps[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-image.sh:287 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall_cmd="sudo pacman -S --noconfirm ${missing_deps[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/lib.sh:92 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho "│ npx skills add marswaveai/skills │" >&2Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/generate-image.sh:281 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall_cmd="sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ${missing_deps[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,260 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim boxingyi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  4. Host or command assembled from base64 fragments≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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