← listenhub@1.0.0

Propose a patch

A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 68 · Caution

Evidence

The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.

Diff · removes 4 caught lines

Download .patch
diff --git a/scripts/generate-image.sh b/scripts/generate-image.sh
--- a/scripts/generate-image.sh
+++ b/scripts/generate-image.sh
@@ -123,1 +123,0 @@
-echo "$input" | openssl base64 -d > "$output" 2>/dev/null
@@ -350,1 +349,0 @@
-echo -n "   Please paste your API key: " >&2
diff --git a/SKILL.md b/SKILL.md
--- a/SKILL.md
+++ b/SKILL.md
@@ -22,1 +22,0 @@
-<instructions>
@@ -492,1 +491,0 @@
-</instructions>

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 1.0.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: listenhub: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 68)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **CAUTION 68/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

- See the findings below.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/clawhub/listenhub/1.0.0

## Findings with a location
- `scripts/generate-image.sh:350` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — scripts/generate-image.sh:350 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering
- `SKILL.md:492` · Fake instruction boundary tag — SKILL.md:492 · Fake instruction boundary tag
- `scripts/generate-image.sh:123` · Host or command assembled from base64 fragments — scripts/generate-image.sh:123 · Host or command assembled from base64 fragments
- `SKILL.md:22` · Fake instruction boundary tag — SKILL.md:22 · Fake instruction boundary tag

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
No GitHub source is recorded for this package, so there is nothing to open; paste the body into the registry's support channel.

We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.