Skills/ClawHub/heysummon

heysummon@0.1.0-beta

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Request expert help by submitting queries to the HeySummon platform, which routes them to registered human providers for assistance." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher thomasansems · publishing for 263 daysInstalls 1,221Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/platform-watcher.sh:68 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# On SIGUSR1: kill active curl to force reconnect (picks up new topics server-side)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/submit-request.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:146 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ✅ **API keys** stored in `.env` (gitignored)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreate `.env` in the skill directory with your HeySummon platform details:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/platform-watcher.sh:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**To default provider (from .env):**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/add-provider.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/list-providers.sh:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/submit-request.sh:50 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/.heysummon-provider-matchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:154 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/platform-watcher.sh:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[ -n "$CURL_PID" ] && kill "$CURL_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/setup.sh:47 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$(cat "$PIDFILE")" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/platform-watcher.sh:191 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$CURL_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/setup.sh:46 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -f "$PIDFILE" ] && kill -0 "$(cat "$PIDFILE")" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/submit-request.sh:165 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -USR1 "$WATCHER_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/submit-request.sh:164 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -n "$WATCHER_PID" ] && kill -0 "$WATCHER_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/teardown.sh:16 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$WATCHER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/teardown.sh:17 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,211 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thomasansems: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim thomasansemsPropose a patch to the maintainer