heysummon@0.1.0-beta
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Request expert help by submitting queries to the HeySummon platform, which routes them to registered human providers for assistance." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
# On SIGUSR1: kill active curl to force reconnect (picks up new topics server-side)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- ✅ **API keys** stored in `.env` (gitignored)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Create `.env` in the skill directory with your HeySummon platform details:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.**To default provider (from .env):**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.[ -f "$SKILL_DIR/.env" ] && set -a && source "$SKILL_DIR/.env" && set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -f /tmp/.heysummon-provider-matchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.[ -n "$CURL_PID" ] && kill "$CURL_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$(cat "$PIDFILE")" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$CURL_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ -f "$PIDFILE" ] && kill -0 "$(cat "$PIDFILE")" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -USR1 "$WATCHER_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ -n "$WATCHER_PID" ] && kill -0 "$WATCHER_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$WATCHER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thomasansems: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.