fanqie-publisher-skill@1.0.2
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "番茄小说章节自动发布工具。使用场景:(1) 发布单个章节到番茄小说平台;(2) 批量发布多个章节;(3) 存入草稿箱;(4) 登录番茄小说作家后台;(5) 查看作品列表和状态。触发词:番茄发布、番茄小说上传、发布章节、存入草稿箱、番茄登录。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
proc = subprocess.Popen(['pbcopy'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 从URL解码书名: chapter-manage/7622646964370279486&%E7%81%B5%E5%A5%91%E8%A7%89%E9%86%92Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.print(" Arch Linux: sudo pacman -S xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.print(" Fedora: sudo dnf install xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(['xsel', '--clipboard', '--input'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(['xclip', '-selection', 'clipboard'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(['clip'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim followaf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.