Skills/ClawHub/fanqie-publisher-skill

fanqie-publisher-skill@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "番茄小说章节自动发布工具。使用场景：(1) 发布单个章节到番茄小说平台；(2) 批量发布多个章节；(3) 存入草稿箱；(4) 登录番茄小说作家后台；(5) 查看作品列表和状态。触发词：番茄发布、番茄小说上传、发布章节、存入草稿箱、番茄登录。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zuoyunlai · publishing for 92 daysInstalls 380Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publisher.py:286 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(['xclip', '-selection', 'clipboard'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/publisher.py:300 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Arch Linux: sudo pacman -S xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publisher.py:273 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(['pbcopy'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publisher.py:293 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(['xsel', '--clipboard', '--input'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/publisher.py:301 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Fedora: sudo dnf install xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/publisher.py:299 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install xclip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publisher.py:279 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(['clip'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentscripts/works.py:216 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads# 从URL解码书名: chapter-manage/7622646964370279486&%E7%81%B5%E5%A5%91%E8%A7%89%E9%86%92Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈473 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zuoyunlai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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