evez-skill-vetter@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Security review for OpenClaw skills before installation. Use when evaluating third-party skills for safety, checking permission scope, detecting suspicious p..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
(r'\bos\.system\s*\(', "command_exec", "os.system() runs shell commands", 20),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.⚠️ Uses subprocess.call() in scripts/run.sh:3Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(r'\beval\s*\(', "code_injection", "eval() can execute arbitrary code", 25),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.(r'\bos\.popen\s*\(', "command_exec", "os.popen() runs shell commands", 18),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(r'process\.env', "env_access", "Reads environment variables", 4),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r'\bexec\s*\(', "code_injection", "exec() can execute arbitrary code", 20),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim evezart: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.