Skills/ClawHub/evez-skill-vetter

evez-skill-vetter@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Security review for OpenClaw skills before installation. Use when evaluating third-party skills for safety, checking permission scope, detecting suspicious p..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher evezart · publishing for 194 daysInstalls 868Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'click'
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/vet.py:25 · OS command execution function call detected(r'\bos\.system\s*\(', "command_exec", "os.system() runs shell commands", 20),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedSKILL.md:40 · Python subprocess execution detected⚠️ Uses subprocess.call() in scripts/run.sh:3Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codescripts/vet.py:22 · Python exec or eval of computed code(r'\beval\s*\(', "code_injection", "eval() can execute arbitrary code", 25),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/vet.py:26 · OS command execution function call detected(r'\bos\.popen\s*\(', "command_exec", "os.popen() runs shell commands", 18),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/vet.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'process\.env', "env_access", "Reads environment variables", 4),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codescripts/vet.py:23 · Python exec or eval of computed code(r'\bexec\s*\(', "code_injection", "exec() can execute arbitrary code", 20),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈398 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim evezart: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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