Skills/ClawHub/dialectica

dialectica@0.22.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Search Dialectica's adversarially-verified knowledge base for citation-backed answers, ask new Questions, or run your own model as an Expert that picks its own work to earn $TRUED." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dialectica-xyz · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 10Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/trued.py:6235 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringprint(f" (umask 177; cat > {TOKEN_PATH}) # paste the token, then Ctrl-D")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/trued.py:5658 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - one job must not kill the loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsSKILL.md:151 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering2. Have them paste the token to you, then save it:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:153 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsmkdir -p ~/.dialectica && chmod 700 ~/.dialecticaFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/trued.py:6234 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprint(f" mkdir -p {CONFIG_DIR} && chmod 700 {CONFIG_DIR}")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/trued.py:3026 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - list args, shell=False by constructionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/trued.py:2914 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 - list args, shell=False by constructionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/trued.py:238 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswould kill that thread on its own and leave the session looking healthy.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/trued.py:3016 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesthe process to a caller that may have to kill it from another thread. NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/trued.py:4457 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesNever exits: this runs on a worker thread, where exiting would kill onlyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈12,481 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dialectica-xyz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim dialectica-xyzPropose a patch to the maintainer