Skills/ClawHub/auto-revolution

auto-revolution@2.0.2

BLOCKED· static only

Publisher claims: "Safe publishing variant of Auto Revolution. Provides structured task templates, review prompts, safety scanning, task state updates, and logging for human su..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cjboy007 · publishing for 238 daysInstalls 906Last detonated 21 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 47/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/security-scan.js:15 · Remote installer piped to shell{ pattern: /curl\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(curl | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/security-scan.js:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions{ pattern: /chmod\s+777/, reason: '设置全权限(chmod 777)' },Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/security-scan.js:168 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceconsole.log(' echo "rm -rf /" | node security-scan.js --stdin');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/security-scan.js:16 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code{ pattern: /wget\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(wget | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/security-scan.js:168 · Destructive file system command detectedconsole.log(' echo "rm -rf /" | node security-scan.js --stdin');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/security-scan.js:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code{ pattern: /curl\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(curl | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/security-scan.js:127 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈674 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

33 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cjboy007: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cjboy007Propose a patch to the maintainer