Skills/ClawHub/auto-revolution

auto-revolution@2.0.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Safe publishing variant of Auto Revolution. Provides structured task templates, review prompts, safety scanning, task state updates, and logging for human su..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cjboy007 · publishing for 238 daysInstalls 906Last detonated 0 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.3sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocess8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/security-scan.js:168 · Destructive file system command detectedconsole.log(' echo "rm -rf /" | node security-scan.js --stdin');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/security-scan.js:168 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceconsole.log(' echo "rm -rf /" | node security-scan.js --stdin');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/security-scan.js:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions{ pattern: /chmod\s+777/, reason: '设置全权限(chmod 777)' },Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/security-scan.js:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code{ pattern: /curl\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(curl | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/security-scan.js:16 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code{ pattern: /wget\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(wget | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/security-scan.js:15 · Remote installer piped to shell{ pattern: /curl\s+[^|]+\|\s*(ba)?sh/, reason: '远程代码执行(curl | sh)' },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/security-scan.js:127 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈674 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cjboy007: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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