Skills/PyPI/yunxiao-projex-mcp

yunxiao-projex-mcp@0.1.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Alibaba Cloud Yunxiao Projex project management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mrlinwang · publishing for 18 daysInstalls 593Last detonated 11 min ago
$claude mcp add yunxiao-projex-mcp -- uvx yunxiao-projex-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_IDYUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: YUNXIAO_API_ENDPOINT, YUNXIAO_API_ORG_ID, YUNXIAO_API_PROJECT_ID, YUNXIAO_USER_NAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_ID, YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx yunxiao-projex-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.1.0

vet-skills diff yunxiao-projex-mcp 0.1.0 0.1.3

This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 2 new credential variables (YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_ID, YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New credential variables
YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_ID, YUNXIAO_USER_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET

0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/yunxiao_projex_mcp/config.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/yunxiao_projex_mcp/server.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"云效 Projex 项目管理 MCP。所有操作固定作用于 .env 中 "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.