yttranscript-mcp@0.4.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Fetch, clean, and search YouTube transcripts — captions-first (rate-limit resistant) with optional Whisper fallback and an MCP server" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso youtube.com, youtu.be — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
# Optional outbound proxy, e.g. "http://user:pass@host:port". Routes everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.format / ``summarize=True``. The default model is ``qwen3.6:27b``; override withFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.summarizer._validate_url("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for yttranscript-mcp@0.4.0 as of 34 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim andrewctf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.