yandex-tracker-mcp-lite@0.1.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Unofficial lean MCP server for Yandex Tracker: 9 tools, compact answers, the whole API behind one escape hatch." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TRACKER_IAM_TOKENTRACKER_TOKENor--show-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: TRACKER_API_BASE, TRACKER_CLOUD_ORG_ID, TRACKER_ORG_ID, TRACKER_READ_ONLY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso yandex.ru, yandex.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names yandex.ru, yandex.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TRACKER_IAM_TOKEN, TRACKER_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return getpass.getpass("Paste the token (hidden): ").strip()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return getpass.getpass("Paste the token (hidden): ").strip()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.done = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for yandex-tracker-mcp-lite@0.1.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tonysafonov: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.