Skills/PyPI/xdarkzx-reaper-mcp

xdarkzx-reaper-mcp@0.8.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for AI-driven music production in REAPER via file-based IPC with a Lua bridge" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher daniel-hodgetts · publishing for 251 daysInstalls 513Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx xdarkzx-reaper-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.5sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:57 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo dnf install -y python3 python3-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_script_tools.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_validate_script_path("../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_safety.py:99 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessafe_path("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandreaper_mcp_shared/constants.py:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# itself. Nothing ever reads this file to kill another process; eachFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:60 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo pacman -S --noconfirm python python-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandreaper_mcp_shared/constants.py:24 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions(%TEMP% is already per-user by default there, and os.chmod onlyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandreaper_mcp_shared/constants.py:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsexists owned by a different user, this chmod attempt simply fails hereFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:361 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$LMSTUDIO_CONFIG_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:84 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu: sudo apt install python3 python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_script_tools.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_validate_script_path("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3 python3-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:47 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceecho " /bin/bash -c \"\$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)\""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:312 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_safety.py:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [".env", ".ENV", "id_rsa", "known_hosts", ".netrc"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for xdarkzx-reaper-mcp@0.8.3 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim daniel-hodgetts: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim daniel-hodgettsPropose a patch to the maintainer