Skills/PyPI/x-mcp-server

x-mcp-server@1.7.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for X (Twitter) API — post, search, like, retweet, follow, and read tweets" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mindmadelab · publishing for 282 daysInstalls 115Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add x-mcp-server -- uvx x-mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACCESS_TOKENACCESS_TOKEN_SECRETAPI_KEYAPI_SECRETBEARER_TOKENCONSUMER_SECRETSECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CONSUMER_KEY, FASTMCP_HOST, FASTMCP_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACCESS_TOKEN, ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET, API_KEY, API_SECRET, BEARER_TOKEN, CONSUMER_SECRET, SECRET_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx x-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:164 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Config: uvx (Recommended)</summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "x": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["x-mcp-server@latest"], "env": { "BEARER_TOKEN": "your-Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_mcp/server.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSet the following environment variables (or put them in a ``.env`` file nextFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_mcp/server.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPath.cwd() / ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_mcp/server.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from CWD or the directory containing this fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:191 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Config: Development (from cloned repo)</summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "x": { "command": "uv", "args": ["run", "--directory", "/path/to/x-mcp", "x-Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_mcp/server.py:168 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(read-write) in your environment or .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_mcp/server.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPath(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent / ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for x-mcp-server@1.7.0 as of 46 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

x-mcp-server@1.7.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills