workspace-operator-mcp@2.0.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Deep Google Workspace automation for AI agents — Apps Script execution, local file transfer, Slides, document templates, cross-product search, and tool profiles" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETS_FILEGOOGLE_TOKEN_FILEMCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GOOGLE_BACKUP_DIR, GOOGLE_LOG_FILE, GOOGLE_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_ALLOW_PUBLIC_SHARING, MCP_AUDIT_LOG, MCP_BULK_ALLOW_SHARED_DRIVES, MCP_BULK_DIR, MCP_CONFIG_FILE, MCP_DRY_RUN, MCP_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, MCP_SCOPE_ROUTING, MCP_TOOL_PROFILE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETS_FILE, GOOGLE_TOKEN_FILE, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
for char in "\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff\u034f\u00ad"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.No other findings across 20,354 lines in 81 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.