Skills/PyPI/word-mcp-live

word-mcp-live@1.6.22

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Microsoft Word — live editing on Windows (COM) and macOS (JXA), plus cross-platform python-docx tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ykarapazar · publishing for 271 daysInstalls 4,179Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTHORMCP_AUTHOR_INITIALSConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_SSE_PATH, MCP_TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com, live.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com, live.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTHOR, MCP_AUTHOR_INITIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx word-mcp-live

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:156 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', '-r', requirements_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsword_document_server/main.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Loading configuration from .env file...", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/core/word_mac.py:40 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:337 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "word-mcp-live"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:425 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(f"Created .env.example at: {env_example_path}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:217 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Docker</b></summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "word": { "command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "ghcr.io/ykarapazar/word-mcp-live"], "enFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:149 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', 'fastmcp'], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:151 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', 'python-docx'], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:193 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>OpenAI Codex (CLI, desktop app, IDE)</b></summary> ```bash codex mcp add word --env MCP_AUTHOR="Your Name" -- uvx word-mcp-live ``` Or add to `~/.coFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:406 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env.example fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:407 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_example_path = os.path.join(base_path, '.env.example')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsword_document_server/main.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file. This must run before anythingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, '-m', 'venv', venv_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/tools/extended_document_tools.py:165 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:13 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/core/word_mac.py:1514 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionword_document_server/core/word_mac.py:1614 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files'Open "/tmp/_word_hf_cleared.txt" For Output As #fileNum',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/core/word_mac.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/core/word_mac.py:1522 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 64 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for word-mcp-live@1.6.22 as of 47 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ykarapazar: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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