Skills/PyPI/willow-mcp

willow-mcp@2.102.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Agent-neutral MCP server — SQLite store, Postgres knowledge base, Kart task queue" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher willow-memory · publishing for 217 daysInstalls 3,166Last detonated 15 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, apple.com, totally-legit.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx willow-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.101.0

vet-skills diff willow-mcp 2.101.0 2.102.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.101.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

2.101.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/net_signer.py:509 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now {UNIT}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/lease.py:213 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsstable. Best-effort: a chown that fails (no such trust owner) is not aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/lease.py:230 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionslogger.warning("lease: issued as root; could not chown %s to the trust owner (%s)", path, e)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:674 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/meter.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/vendor_drift.py:120 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:549 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:664 · Python subprocess execution detectedimported = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/net_signer.py:507 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo install -m 644 {rendered_path} /etc/systemd/system/{UNIT} && "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:87 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges|| sudo -u postgres psql -c "CREATE ROLE \"$WILLOW_PG_USER\" WITH LOGIN SUPERUSER;" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# $WILLOW_PG_USER and the DB via `sudo -u postgres`, for aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/presence.py:119 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/meter.py:32 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions``chmod a+r`` the ``energy_uj`` files via a udev rule, or run willow-mcp'sFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/lease.py:3 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesThe sudo invariant (FRANK `90e52ab7`): *a model may REQUEST egress, neverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/willow_mcp/gate.py:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# and a self-grantable capability (issue #183, part of the #181 kill chain).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/keyring.py:513 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"holds secret key material — `chmod 600 {p}` and try again. (A "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/blockers.py:179 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"terminal: sudo chmod 644 {row.get('path')} (a lease is a public "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/reloader.py:1671 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", *args], check=False,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/repo_sweep.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/blockers.py:179 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"terminal: sudo chmod 644 {row.get('path')} (a lease is a public "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:117 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "willow_mcp"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:547 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"""Export the named public key for verification after sudo changes HOME."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/willow_mcp/net_signer.py:438 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — one bad request must not kill the signerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:639 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesmerely because sudo intentionally discarded its environment.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/paths.py:408 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreader and ``install.sh``'s own resolution (root's sudo environment,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/net_signer.py:508 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo install -o willow-operator -g willow-operator -m 644 {ring_source} {ring_dest} && "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:92 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges|| sudo -u postgres createdb -O "$WILLOW_PG_USER" "$WILLOW_PG_DB" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:517 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresssrc/willow_mcp/web_fetch.py:525 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials`Location: https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` was followed, and theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/willow_mcp/lease.py:207 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesMeasured 2026-09-10 (gap d90246688413): `sudo … willow-mcp grant-net`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:85 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif [ "${WILLOW_PG_BOOTSTRAP_ROLE:-0}" = "1" ] && command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/willow_mcp/repo_sweep.py:62 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh:86 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -tc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='$WILLOW_PG_USER'" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/fleet_seams.py:457 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingscripts/fleet_seams.py:456 · Dynamic module loadingmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/paths.py:746 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsown permissions block it regardless of what's excluded from any chownFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/willow_mcp/pgp.py:214 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsplay, matching how install.sh actually provisions trust (chown thisFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim willow-memory: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim willow-memoryPropose a patch to the maintainer