willow-mcp@2.102.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Agent-neutral MCP server — SQLite store, Postgres knowledge base, Kart task queue" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, apple.com, totally-legit.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.101.0
vet-skills diff willow-mcp 2.101.0 2.102.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.101.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
2.101.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
f"sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now {UNIT}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.stable. Best-effort: a chown that fails (no such trust owner) is not aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.logger.warning("lease: issued as root; could not chown %s to the trust owner (%s)", path, e)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.imported = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"sudo install -m 644 {rendered_path} /etc/systemd/system/{UNIT} && "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.|| sudo -u postgres psql -c "CREATE ROLE \"$WILLOW_PG_USER\" WITH LOGIN SUPERUSER;" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# $WILLOW_PG_USER and the DB via `sudo -u postgres`, for aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``chmod a+r`` the ``energy_uj`` files via a udev rule, or run willow-mcp'sFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.The sudo invariant (FRANK `90e52ab7`): *a model may REQUEST egress, neverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# and a self-grantable capability (issue #183, part of the #181 kill chain).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"holds secret key material — `chmod 600 {p}` and try again. (A "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.f"terminal: sudo chmod 644 {row.get('path')} (a lease is a public "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", *args], check=False,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"terminal: sudo chmod 644 {row.get('path')} (a lease is a public "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "willow_mcp"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Export the named public key for verification after sudo changes HOME."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — one bad request must not kill the signerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.merely because sudo intentionally discarded its environment.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.reader and ``install.sh``'s own resolution (root's sudo environment,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"sudo install -o willow-operator -g willow-operator -m 644 {ring_source} {ring_dest} && "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.|| sudo -u postgres createdb -O "$WILLOW_PG_USER" "$WILLOW_PG_DB" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.`Location: https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` was followed, and theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Measured 2026-09-10 (gap d90246688413): `sudo … willow-mcp grant-net`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [ "${WILLOW_PG_BOOTSTRAP_ROLE:-0}" = "1" ] && command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo -u postgres psql -tc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='$WILLOW_PG_USER'" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.own permissions block it regardless of what's excluded from any chownFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.play, matching how install.sh actually provisions trust (chown thisFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim willow-memory: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.