Skills/PyPI/whitebit-mcp

whitebit-mcp@2.1.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that exposes the WhiteBIT exchange API as AI tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 729 daysInstalls 126Last detonated 15 min ago
$claude mcp add whitebit-mcp -- uvx whitebit-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH_TOKENWHITEBIT_API_KEYWHITEBIT_SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, WHITEBIT_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso whitebit.com, imoney24.technology — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names whitebit.com, imoney24.technology as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, WHITEBIT_API_KEY, WHITEBIT_SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx whitebit-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentials.github/workflows/mirror.yml:87 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakinggit remote set-url origin https://x-access-token:${ROBOT_GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/${{ env.TARGET_REPO }}.gitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:195 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"\n[mcp_servers.{MCP_SERVER_NAME}.env]\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:263 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.github/workflows/mirror.yml:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--exclude='.env' \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/whitebit-healthcheck/SKILL.md:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| Auth error | Ask user for new API keys, update `.env` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:152 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandserver.py:93 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Spot trading — orders and kill switchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)setup_mcp.py:204 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"""Upsert [mcp_servers.whitebit] HTTP block in Codex config.toml."""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈19,703 tok
12 files · 44 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.