wger-mcp@2.7.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing the wger fitness/nutrition REST API as tools, with pluggable auth" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso auth0.com, openfoodfacts.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mcp: MCPServer, api: AuthenticatedClient, off_http: httpx2.AsyncClient, settings: SettingsFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Read settings from this file; it must exist. Defaults to ./.env for "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.def register(mcp: MCPServer, http: httpx2.AsyncClient, settings: Settings) -> None:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.MCPServer instance, the upstream HTTP client, and whichever transport is running.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# ./.env would otherwise reach the settings by a route no test controls.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.DEFAULT_ENV_FILE = ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# See .env.example for every supported variable.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("MCP_AUTH=oidc\nWGER_BASE_URL=https://poisoned.test\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("MCP_AUTH=oidc\nWGER_BASE_URL=https://poisoned.test\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""The CWD belongs to the client, so ./.env must not configure the server.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.def _register_off(settings: Settings) -> tuple[MCPServer, httpx2.AsyncClient]:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.MCP_AUTH=oidc (the uncommented default in .env.example) died on the oidcFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.things that break stdio servers — a log line on stdout, a ``.env`` picked upFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.def _register_off(settings: Settings) -> tuple[MCPServer, httpx2.AsyncClient]:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for wger-mcp@2.7.1 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wger-project: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.