Skills/PyPI/webscout-mcp

webscout-mcp@3.2.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Self-healing web access layer for AI Agents: search, fetch, extract, progressive content delivery, provider routing, recovery, browser fallback, caching, and observability over the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Optional Jev shadow evaluator and vector/AI/browser extras are available separately." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher wxs-lang · publishing for 86 daysInstalls 4,697Last detonated 28 min ago
$claude mcp add webscout-mcp -- uvx webscout-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENQQ_EMAIL_AUTH_CODEConfiguration, not credentials: CI_RUNNER_ID, GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY, GITLAB_RUNNER_DESCRIPTION, QQ_EMAIL_USER, RUNNER_NAME, SLO_FETCH_P95, SLO_FETCH_SUCCESS_30D, SLO_FETCH_SUCCESS_7D, SLO_MCP_SUCCESS_7D, SLO_SEARCH_P95, SLO_SEARCH_SUCCESS_30D, SLO_SEARCH_SUCCESS_7D, SLO_THIN_CONTENT_RATE, SLO_TRUNCATION_RATE, SLO_USABLE_CONTENT_RATE, WEBSCOUT_RESULTS_DIR, WEBSCOUT_RUN_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org, tiangolo.com, reuters.com, medium.com, ycombinator.com, amazon.com, reddit.com, zhihu.com, hnrss.org, postgresql.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names python.org, tiangolo.com, reuters.com, medium.com, ycombinator.com, amazon.com, reddit.com, zhihu.com, hnrss.org, postgresql.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GITHUB_TOKEN, QQ_EMAIL_AUTH_CODE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx webscout-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.3.0

vet-skills diff webscout-mcp 2.3.0 3.2.4

This version reaches for something 2.3.0 did not: 6 new hosts (amazon.com, medium.com, reddit.com, reuters.com, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
amazon.com, medium.com, reddit.com, reuters.com, ycombinator.com, zhihu.com
No longer contacted
bing.com, brave.com, duckduckgo.com, google.com, ollama.com

2.3.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:36 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R appuser:appuser /home/appuserFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:23 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_eval_cli.py:43 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(cli) # type: ignore[union-attr]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagdocs/tools.md:169 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file"rules": "<rules>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_eval_cli.py:42 · Dynamic module loadingcli = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/benchmark_tools.py:756 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringhttps://104.20.23.154/ + Host: example.com -> SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILUREFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:31 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /tmp/*.whlFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/benchmark_tools.py:756 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot namehttps://104.20.23.154/ + Host: example.com -> SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILUREFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_objective_evaluation.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=REPO, text=True).strip()Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_installation.py:194 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run([exe, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_config.py:55 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime"""Test Config hot-reload functionality."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/active_monitor.py:130 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["pgrep", "-f", process_name], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/active_monitor.py:231 · Python subprocess execution detecteddisk = subprocess.run(["df", "-h", "/"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_utils.py:236 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetsafe, reason = is_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1", allow_private=True)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:241 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessafe, reason = is_safe_url("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/watchdog.py:93 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_basic.py:259 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_utils.py:219 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetsafe, reason = is_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/watchdog.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["pgrep", "-f", pattern], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈110 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.