webscope-mcp@0.6.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server (stdio, standard library only) that gives a coding agent short answers about a project" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
SECRETS = (".env", ".env.*", "*.pem", "*.key", "*.p12", "id_rsa*", "id_ed25519*", "auth.json", "credentials*")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script, f.name, match], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""True if the file name usually holds secrets (`.env`, keys, credentials), except `.example` templates."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.split("\n")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["grep", "-rnIiEH" if regex else "-rnIiFH", *[f"--exclude-dir={d}" for d in GENERATED],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.eval(preg_replace('/^\\s*<\\?php/', '', file_get_contents('{remote}')));Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.p = subprocess.run([str(script), statement], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=ROOT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(["grep", "-rnHE", "--include=*.php", pattern, str(target)], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "php", "artisan", "route:list", "--json"], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."usage": "[<.env path>] [<ZZ_E2E mark>] [<table>]"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen([str(a) for a in argv], cwd=cfg["root"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."files). Case-insensitive. Use it instead of grep. To see the code use read. Read-only, inside the root; skips secrets (.env, *.key...).",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=None if container else workdir)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(f"Test written: {spec} (injects {js.name}). Run it with BASE=<app url> npx playwright test {spec.name}; it spends no model.")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// Usage: BASE=<app url> [STORAGE=<session saved with `npx playwright codegen --save-storage`>] npx playwright test {file}Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "rm", "-f", remote], capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(["grep", "-rlE", rf"\$table *= *['\"]{table}['\"]", str(modules)], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(["grep", "-rqE", pattern, str(path)], capture_output=True).returncode == 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["docker", "cp", local.name, f"{container}:{remote}"], capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Loads the manifest from `--manifest`, WEBSCOPE_MANIFEST or ./webscope.json (with none, the current folder without scripts) and serves JSON-RPC on standard input."""Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for webscope-mcp@0.6.0 as of 47 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim partprogramming09: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.