Skills/PyPI/webex-bot-mcp

webex-bot-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Webex Teams — manage rooms, messages, and memberships via AI assistants" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher webexcommunity · publishing for 182 daysInstalls 100Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add webex-bot-mcp -- uvx webex-bot-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
WEBEX_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: LOG_FORMAT, METRICS_ENABLED, METRICS_ENDPOINT, WEBEX_DEBUG, WEBEX_DEFAULT_MESSAGE_FORMAT, WEBEX_DEFAULT_ROOM_TYPE, WEBEX_ORG_DOMAIN, WEBEX_RATE_LIMIT_API_CALLS_PER_MINUTE, WEBEX_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_SECOND, WEBEX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, WEBEX_VALIDATE_SSL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso adaptivecards.io, webex.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names adaptivecards.io, webex.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WEBEX_ACCESS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx webex-bot-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesCLAUDE.md:181 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdocs: add conventional commits guide to CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/webex_bot_mcp/main.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env before importing tools so WEBEX_ACCESS_TOKEN is available at import timeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:25 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:42 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chown -R webexbot:webexbot /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCOPY .env.template ./Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,007 tok
2 files · 30 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for webex-bot-mcp@0.2.0 as of 37 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

webex-bot-mcp@0.2.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills