Skills/PyPI/wayland-mcp

wayland-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Wayland MCP server (Python, uvx-compatible)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher someaka · publishing for 589 daysInstalls 116Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_CONFIG_DIR, MCP_TEST_NO_MOUSE, VLM_MODEL, WAYLAND_DISPLAY, WAYLAND_MCP_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, kernel.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, kernel.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx wayland-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/ls
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/ls
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:22 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "$USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/evemu-event" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-event >/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:10 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt install -y evemu-toolsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:16 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chmod u+s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -l | grep -q 'NOPASSWD.*evemu-event' && echo "evemu-event Sudoers OK" || echo "evemu-event Sudoers FAILED"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:39 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 666 $dev 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/mouse_utils.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detecteddesc = subprocess.check_output(["evemu-describe", dev_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:176 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "$USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/evemu-event" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-event >/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/keyboard_utils.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:143 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:167 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:78 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:103 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:16 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod u+s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/mouse_utils.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/keyboard_utils.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detecteddesc = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/keyboard_utils.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwayland_mcp/app.py:112 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for wayland-mcp@0.4.0 as of 32 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim someaka: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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