wayland-mcp@0.4.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Wayland MCP server (Python, uvx-compatible)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_CONFIG_DIR, MCP_TEST_NO_MOUSE, VLM_MODEL, WAYLAND_DISPLAY, WAYLAND_MCP_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, kernel.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, kernel.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
sudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "$USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/evemu-event" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-event >/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt install -y evemu-toolsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo chmod u+s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -l | grep -q 'NOPASSWD.*evemu-event' && echo "evemu-event Sudoers OK" || echo "evemu-event Sudoers FAILED"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo chmod 666 $dev 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.desc = subprocess.check_output(["evemu-describe", dev_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo "$USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/evemu-event" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-event >/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo chmod u+s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.desc = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for wayland-mcp@0.4.0 as of 32 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim someaka: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.