Skills/PyPI/vulnerability-exposure-mcp

vulnerability-exposure-mcp@1.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that checks IPs, domains, CVEs and software versions for confirmed vulnerabilities and exposure" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mrfrazer25 · publishing for 27 daysInstalls 893Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEYGREYNOISE_API_KEYNVD_API_KEYSHODAN_API_KEYVIRUSTOTAL_API_KEYVT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: VULN_EXPOSURE_CACHE, VULN_EXPOSURE_CACHE_DIR, VULN_EXPOSURE_LOG_LEVEL, VULN_EXPOSURE_QUOTA_PER_HOUR, VULN_EXPOSURE_WATCHLIST
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso nist.gov, cisa.gov, first.org, osv.dev, shodan.io, greynoise.io, spamhaus.org, crt.sh, sans.edu, certspotter.com, virustotal.com, abuseipdb.com, mitre.org, endoflife.date — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nist.gov, cisa.gov, first.org, osv.dev, shodan.io, greynoise.io, spamhaus.org, crt.sh, sans.edu, certspotter.com, virustotal.com, abuseipdb.com, mitre.org, endoflife.date as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY, GREYNOISE_API_KEY, NVD_API_KEY, SHODAN_API_KEY, VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY, VT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vulnerability-exposure-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.1.0

vet-skills diff vulnerability-exposure-mcp 1.1.0 1.2.1

This version reaches for something 1.1.0 did not: 14 new hosts (abuseipdb.com, certspotter.com, cisa.gov, crt.sh, …) · 6 new credential variables (ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY, GREYNOISE_API_KEY, NVD_API_KEY, SHODAN_API_KEY, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
abuseipdb.com, certspotter.com, cisa.gov, crt.sh, endoflife.date, first.org, greynoise.io, mitre.org, nist.gov, osv.dev, sans.edu, shodan.io +2
New credential variables
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY, GREYNOISE_API_KEY, NVD_API_KEY, SHODAN_API_KEY, VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY, VT_API_KEY

1.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Image alt text carrying instructions; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_lookups.py:1141 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials@pytest.mark.parametrize("location", ["http://other.example/", "https://169.254.169.254/latest", "https://[::1]/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:21 · Image alt text carrying instructionsClaude running "Run a security assessment of PHP 8.3.10" with this server: 7 tool calls, a report that passed check_report, an executive summary and a key findiFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_lookups.py:1142 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvulnerability_exposure_mcp/inputs.py:22 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# *sbom*.json). Anything else is refused, so a mistyped path can't send another file's lines anywhere.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDvulnerability_exposure_mcp/lookups.py:3563 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareENDOFLIFE_URL = "https://endoflife.date/api/v1/products"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDvulnerability_exposure_mcp/lookups.py:3869 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware"source": "endoflife.date (https://endoflife.date/windows)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedvulnerability_exposure_mcp/inputs.py:180 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentstripped = text.lstrip(" \t\r\n")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_review_fixes.py:350 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials("https://169.254.169.254/latest", "private address"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 34 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for vulnerability-exposure-mcp@1.2.1 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mrfrazer25: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mrfrazer25Propose a patch to the maintainer