vps-guardian-mcp@0.37.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Secure MCP server for Linux VPS observability, guarded administration, and AI-agent collaboration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SSH_AUTH_SOCKConfiguration, not credentials: DOCKER_HOST, INVOCATION_ID, JOURNAL_STREAM, ProgramData, SSH_CLIENT, SSH_CONNECTION, VPS_GUARDIAN_AUDIT_LOG, VPS_GUARDIAN_CAPSULE_PYTHON_IMAGE, VPS_GUARDIAN_CONFIRM_TTL, VPS_GUARDIAN_GATEWAY_AGENT, VPS_GUARDIAN_MODE, VPS_GUARDIAN_PROJECT_ROOTS, VPS_GUARDIAN_SNAPSHOT_DIR, VPS_GUARDIAN_STATE_DIR, VPS_GUARDIAN_TOOL_PROFILE, VPS_GUARDIAN_WORKLOAD_BASELINE_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_AUTH_SOCK and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
status_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([docker, "compose", "version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=8, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.is_active_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.response = subprocess.run([systemctl, "show", "--property=MainPID", "--value", "--", service_name], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=4, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([docker, "image", "inspect", image, "--format", "{{.Id}}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return {"status": "ok", "agent": _summary(policy), "note": "Grant this Unix account access to selected project files separately. Never give it sudo or Docker group access."}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."error": "Permission denied: Root or sudo privileges are required to inspect UFW firewall rules.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([journal, "--no-pager", "-o", "short-iso", "--since", f"{since_minutes} minutes ago", "-n", str(journal_lines)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=12, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Ensure user is added to 'docker' group: 'sudo usermod -aG docker $USER'."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.completed = subprocess.run(full_command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# In-memory UID to username cache to avoid redundant /etc/passwd lookupsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ss_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.is_enabled_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-c", _PARSER, check], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/useradd", "--system", "--user-group", "--no-create-home", "--home-dir", str(home),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HIDDEN = re.compile(r"(?i)(^\.env(?:\.|$)|secret|credential|password|^id_(?:rsa|ed25519)|\.(?:pem|key|db|sqlite|log|bak)$)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.c_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.c_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([docker, "compose", "-f", from_file, "config", "--quiet"], cwd=project, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([node, "--check", path], cwd=project, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=min(remaining, 5), check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.removed = subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/userdel", account], timeout=10, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.post_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cleanup = subprocess.run([docker, "rm", "-f", "--volumes", name], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.j_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ar_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ssl_proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/ssh-keygen", "-q", "-t", "ed25519", "-N", "", "-f", str(path)], check=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([docker, "image", "inspect", image, "--format", "{{.Id}}"], capture_output=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(args, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.merge_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.denied = subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/ssh", *args, "true"], capture_output=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.up_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.endpoint = subprocess.run([docker, "context", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Endpoints.docker.Host}}"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.zone_result = subprocess.run([firewall_cmd, "--zone", zone, "--list-all"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.details = subprocess.run([firewall_cmd, "--get-default-zone"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([git, "-C", path, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.processes = subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/ps", "-u", str(user.pw_uid), "-o", "args="], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=3)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.origin_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res_ls = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.outsider = subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/runuser", "-u", "nobody", "--", "/bin/cat", str(feed_path)], capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.feed_write = subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/runuser", "-u", account, "--", "/bin/sh", "-c", 'printf forged >> "$1"', "sh", str(feed_path)], capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/pkill", "-KILL", "-u", str(user.pw_uid)], timeout=5, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-I", "-S", "-B", "-c", checker], input=json.dumps(sources), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.leak = subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/runuser", "-u", account, "--", "/bin/cat", str(snapshot)], capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.daemon = subprocess.Popen(["/usr/sbin/sshd", "-D", "-e", "-f", str(config)], stdout=log, stderr=log)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(command_map[manager], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.direct = subprocess.run(["/usr/sbin/runuser", "-u", account, "--", "/bin/sh", "-c", 'printf bypass >> "$1"', "sh", str(project / "main.py")], capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.pip_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.pre_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.pull_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.up_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen([*args, *path_args], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = web.check_http_endpoint("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], check=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for relative in ("../outside.py", ".env", "main.py", "missing/child.py", "bad\nname.py"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…installs Docker, pulls images, downloads dependencies or grants a worker Docker/sudo access. For the defaults, preload only the runtime you need: ```bash docker pull pyth…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.The content is untouched; arbitrary chmod modes and paths outside /var/wwwFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.… "requirepass redis-secret", "+TOKEN=diff-secret", "-password removed-secret", "https://private-user:[email protected]", "https://[email protected]"] for value in …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.write("requirements.txt", "private-package @ https://user:[email protected]/package.whl\n--extra-index-url https://[email protected]\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… sorted(set(stack)), "files": sorted(item for item in files if item in {"package.json", "pyproject.toml", "requirements.txt", "go.mod", "Cargo.toml", "docker-compose.yml", "compose.yaml", "Dockerfile"}), "git": {"available": git_status["av…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.with open(os.path.join(self.project, ".env"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as file:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.res = docker_container_action("my_container; rm -rf /", "start")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", script], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.code = "from src.files import _redact_config_text; s='x'*300000+' https://user:secret@host'; out,n=_redact_config_text(s); assert 'secret' not in out and n==1"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.project_workspace.stage_project_file_change(self.patch_id, ".env", "API_TOKEN=new\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for paths in (["../main.py"], [".env"], ["main.py", "main.py"], ["main.py"] * 17):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.This intentionally does not expose arbitrary chmod semantics. It supportsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.SENSITIVE_NAME = re.compile(r"(?i)(^\.env(?:\.|$)|^id_(?:rsa|ed25519|ecdsa)|secret|credential|password|private[_-]?key|^\.npmrc$|^\.pypirc$)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-B", "-c", capsules._UNITTEST], cwd=self.project, capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.timeout: Grace period in seconds before forcible kill on stop/restart (default: 10).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.self.assertNotIn(".env", names)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-B", "-c", capsules._UNITTEST], cwd=self.project, capture_output=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = compose.compose_project_action(self.compose_file, "restart", ["web; rm -rf /"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(self.project / ".env").write_text("TOKEN=secret", encoding="utf-8")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = compose.compose_project_action(self.compose_file, "restart", ["web; rm -rf /"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.timeout: Stop/restart timeout in seconds before forcible kill (default: 10).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.seen["excluded"] = [name for name in (".env", "private.pem") if os.path.exists(os.path.join(snapshot, name))]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.completed = subprocess.run(command, cwd=snapshot, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = docker_container_action("my_container; rm -rf /", "start")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for vps-guardian-mcp@0.37.0 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim murzirius: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.