Skills/PyPI/vox-mcp

vox-mcp@0.9.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Multi-model AI gateway for MCP clients — routes prompts to Gemini, OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI, DeepSeek, Moonshot, OpenRouter, Cloudflare AI Gateway, Vercel AI Gateway, and local models with conversation memory" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher linxule · publishing for 264 daysInstalls 260Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com, deepseek.com, cloudflare.com, vercel.sh, kimi.ai, moonshot.cn, openrouter.ai, x.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vox-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Match server environment/.env precedence without loading the server.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconfig.py:82 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# - prompt.txt file content (alternative user input method)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_ENV_PATH = _PROJECT_ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontools/shared/base_tool.py:908 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"instructions": "Save prompt to 'prompt.txt' and include its absolute path on resend.",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Return True when VOX_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE is enabled via the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/security_config.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesExample: /etc is dangerous, so /etc/passwd is also blocked.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Reload .env values and recompute override semantics.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_model_settings.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_model_settings.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationtools/shared/base_tool.py:814 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsmechanism to bypass token constraints while preserving response capacity.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/security_config.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_mapping: Optional mapping used instead of reading the .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:143 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info("VOX_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE enabled - .env file values will override system environment variables")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/file_types.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", # EnvironmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Account verification phishing language detectedREADME.md:232 · Account verification phishing language detected · informational: not an instruction filesaving a default does not verify your account's access to that model.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Expose the loaded .env mapping for diagnostics/logging."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontools/shared/base_tool.py:901 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Save the full prompt text to 'prompt.txt' in the working directory and resend the request "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈85 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for vox-mcp@0.9.0 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim linxule: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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