vivado-mcp@0.3.27
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Vivado MCP Server — AI 驱动的 FPGA 开发助手,支持 GUI 可视化 / 子进程无头双模式,自动诊断 CRITICAL WARNING" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso spiritconsortium.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hex-encoded string detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
probe = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.validate_identifier("synth_1; exec rm -rf /", "run_name")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.built = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# utf-8-sig 会吃掉 BOM;这里故意用 utf-8 让 BOM 以 '' 留在文本里,Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.malicious = '} ; exec rm -rf / ; {'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._MAGIC_BODY = b"\x0f\xf0\x0f\xf0\x0f\xf0\x0f\xf0\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.validate_identifier("synth_1; exec rm -rf /", "run_name")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.malicious = '} ; exec rm -rf / ; {'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Unix: 单进程 kill(非 killpg,旧注释"kill 进程组"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ip_name="xdma;rm -rf /", session_id="default", ctx=ctxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.ip_name="xdma;rm -rf /", session_id="default", ctx=ctxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mapleleavessssssss-wq: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Hex-encoded string detected≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.