vinted-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Vinted: search, item details, favourites, messages, offers, orders and listing management for AI agents. Also ships a CLI and a typed Python client." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VINTED_CSRF_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: VINTED_CONFIG_DIR, VINTED_COOKIES, VINTED_DOMAIN, VINTED_IMPERSONATE, VINTED_RATE_PACE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso api.vinted — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names api.vinted as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VINTED_CSRF_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run([str(cli_bin), "--help"], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.exclude = ["**/__pycache__", "cookies.txt", "session.json", ".env"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b>How the session stays alive</b></summary> Vinted uses two cookies: `access_token_web` (JWT, ~1 h; anonymous visitors get one too, without a user) anFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.forbidden = {"cookies.txt", "credentials.json", "session.json", ".env"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.version = subprocess.run([str(mcp_bin), "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.pw = subprocess.run(["security", "find-generic-password", "-w", "-s", label],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim figurophobia: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.