vigil-mcp@0.2.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Proactive memory layer for AI — the AI that reaches back out to you" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 19 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYVIGIL_DISCORD_WEBHOOKVIGIL_SECRET_TOKENVIGIL_SLACK_SIGNING_SECRETVIGIL_SLACK_WEBHOOKVIGIL_VAPID_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: TIMEZONE, VIGIL_FEATURES, VIGIL_IDLE_HOURS, VIGIL_REPORT_HOUR, VIGIL_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY, VIGIL_VAPID_SUB- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso slack.com, discord.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names slack.com, discord.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, VIGIL_DISCORD_WEBHOOK, VIGIL_SECRET_TOKEN, VIGIL_SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET, VIGIL_SLACK_WEBHOOK, VIGIL_VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Discord webhook URL; Discord webhook URL; Slack webhook URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if not webhook_url.startswith("https://discord.com/api/webhooks/"):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.subprocess.run(["notify-send", "--", title, message], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if url and not url.startswith("https://discord.com/api/webhooks/"):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if not webhook_url.startswith("https://hooks.slack.com/"):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.webhook_url: The https://discord.com/api/webhooks/... URL.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if url and not url.startswith("https://hooks.slack.com/"):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return "Invalid Discord webhook URL. Should start with https://discord.com/api/webhooks/"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.subprocess.run(["powershell", "-Command", script], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return "Invalid Slack webhook URL. Should start with https://hooks.slack.com/"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.print("# Add these to your environment (.env file or Railway vars):")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.placeholder="https://discord.com/api/webhooks/…">Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# Auto-update state based on phaseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.placeholder="https://hooks.slack.com/services/…">Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.webhook_url: The https://hooks.slack.com/services/... URL.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim prodbysilky: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Discord webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.