Skills/PyPI/vidhex-mcp

vidhex-mcp@0.5.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Video Skill MCP server + agent skill + CLI (install / login / jobs)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 729 daysInstalls 520Last detonated 12 min ago
$claude mcp add vidhex-mcp -- uvx vidhex_mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VIDEO_SKILL_API_KEYVIDEO_SKILL_AUTH_URLConfiguration, not credentials: VIDEO_SKILL_API_URL, VIDEO_SKILL_DIRECT_UPLOAD_MIN_BYTES, VIDEO_SKILL_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso vidhex.cloud — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names vidhex.cloud as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VIDEO_SKILL_API_KEY, VIDEO_SKILL_AUTH_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vidhex_mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_auth.py:495 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# POSIX 上必须是 0600;Windows 上 chmod 语义有限,不强制断言Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/video_skill_mcp/auth.py:181 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionspass # Windows 上 chmod 语义有限,尽力而为Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/video_skill_mcp/install.py:328 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionspass # Windows 上 chmod 语义不同;失败不影响功能Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/video_skill_mcp/skills/video-skill/SKILL.md:99 · Destructive file system command detected| Job failed | Show the error message and suggest checking the format / size |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_skill_mcp/install.py:494 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/video_skill_mcp/install.py:18 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions(chmod 600),MCP 配置里只留网关地址,不重复存密钥。Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,848 tok
1 file · 30 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.