Skills/PyPI/video-vision-mcp

video-vision-mcp@0.5.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that turns any video (local file or URL) into frames + transcript for Claude." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher kitdevua · publishing for 106 daysInstalls 420Last detonated 12 min ago
$claude mcp add video-vision-mcp -- uvx video-vision-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYGOOGLE_API_KEYGROQ_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: VIDEO_MCP_CACHE_DIR, VIDEO_MCP_CACHE_TTL_HOURS, VIDEO_MCP_DISABLE_GEMINI, VIDEO_MCP_ENV, VIDEO_MCP_FRAME_INTERVAL_SEC, VIDEO_MCP_FRAME_MAX_PX, VIDEO_MCP_GEMINI_MODEL, VIDEO_MCP_MAX_FRAMES, VIDEO_MCP_WHISPER_MODEL, VIDEO_MCP_WHISPER_MODEL_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.dev, huggingface.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.dev, huggingface.co as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, GROQ_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx video-vision-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_vision_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Configuration loaded from a `.env` file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_smoke.py:68 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials_assert_public_http("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/backends/tier2_cloud_asr.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/media/ffmpeg_tools.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.json:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Optional path to a .env file with config (API keys, tuning).",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_vision_mcp/server.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesGroq > local whisper.cpp, based on which keys are present in the .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_smoke.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Isolate from any real .env up the directory tree.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/backends/tier1_local.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/media/ffmpeg_tools.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:20 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesrun: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y cmake build-essentialFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_smoke.py:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_assert_public_http("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_vision_mcp/config.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load .env from VIDEO_MCP_ENV (if set), then the nearest .env up the tree.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/media/ffmpeg_tools.py:84 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/video_vision_mcp/media/ffmpeg_tools.py:120 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈487 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.