Skills/PyPI/video-research-mcp

video-research-mcp@0.7.1

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for video analysis, document extraction, cited research and optional knowledge storage" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher galbaz1 · publishing for 52 daysInstalls 356Last detonated 26 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
COHERE_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYINFRA_ADMIN_TOKENOPENAI_API_KEYS2_API_KEYSEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEYWEAVIATE_API_KEYYOUTUBE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLEAR_CACHE_ON_SHUTDOWN, DEEP_RESEARCH_AGENT, DOC_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, FLASH_SUMMARIZE, GEMINI_CACHE_DIR, GEMINI_CACHE_TTL_DAYS, GEMINI_CONTEXT_CACHE_TTL, GEMINI_FLASH_MODEL, GEMINI_MAX_SESSIONS, GEMINI_MODEL, GEMINI_RETRY_BASE_DELAY, GEMINI_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS, GEMINI_RETRY_MAX_DELAY, GEMINI_SESSION_DB, GEMINI_SESSION_MAX_TURNS, GEMINI_SESSION_TIMEOUT_HOURS, GEMINI_TEMPERATURE, GEMINI_THINKING_LEVEL, GEMINI_TRACING_ENABLED, INFRA_MUTATIONS_ENABLED, LOCAL_FILE_ACCESS_ROOT, MLFLOW_EXPERIMENT_NAME, MLFLOW_TRACKING_URI, RERANKER_ENABLED, RERANKER_PROVIDER, RESEARCH_DOCUMENT_MAX_SOURCES, RESEARCH_DOCUMENT_PHASE_CONCURRENCY, VIDEO_OUTPUT_DIR, WEAVIATE_AUTO_MIGRATE, WEAVIATE_OLLAMA_API_ENDPOINT, WEAVIATE_OLLAMA_MODEL, WEAVIATE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, semanticscholar.org, youtube.com, astral.sh, docker.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, semanticscholar.org, youtube.com, astral.sh, docker.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects COHERE_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, INFRA_ADMIN_TOKEN, OPENAI_API_KEY, S2_API_KEY, SEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEY, WEAVIATE_API_KEY, YOUTUBE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx video-research-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sfilesystemread ~/.claude/gr-file-manifest.json · ~/.claude.json · ~/.claude/commands/gr/video.md · ~/.claude/commands/gr/video-chat.md · ~/.claude/commands/gr/research.md · ~/.claude/commands/gr/analyze.md outside project
20sfilesystemwrote ~/.claude.json · ~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env · ~/.claude/gr-file-manifest.json
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (Credentials stay in local config and authenticate provider requests) 3. Restart Claude Code, then run: /gr:getting-started This will verify your setup and show you what's available.
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/lib/config.js:114 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Template for ~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandbin/lib/config.js:160 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions'# - This file is stored in your user config dir (chmod 600 recommended)',Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/dotenv.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse a ``.env`` file into a dict of key-value pairs.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/install.js:42 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeUsage: npx video-research-mcp@latest [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/dotenv.py:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath: Path to the ``.env`` file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/video_research_mcp/client.py:47 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsraise ValueError("No Gemini API key — set GEMINI_API_KEY or pass api_key explicitly")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/dotenv.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env`` when they aren't alreadyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/config.py:285 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesLoads ``~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env`` before reading env vars.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_release.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/lib/config.js:138 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Ensure ~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env exists with a commented template.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/lib/config.js:147 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = path.join(envDir, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/export_installer_state_matrix.py:184 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/detect_review_scope.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/detect_review_scope.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/dotenv.py:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath: Path to the ``.env`` file. Defaults to :data:`DEFAULT_ENV_PATH`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/install.js:261 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesui.step(' ~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/video_research_mcp/dotenv.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesDEFAULT_ENV_PATH = Path.home() / ".config" / "video-research-mcp" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈540 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/video-research-mcp/.env.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim galbaz1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim galbaz1Propose a patch to the maintainer