Skills/PyPI/vgs-bc-mcp

vgs-bc-mcp@0.14.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Resilient MCP stdio proxy for Microsoft Dynamics 365 Business Central — fork of microsoft/BCTech BcMCPProxyPython with reconnect, silent token refresh, and surfaced upstream errors." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vangeldersolutions · publishing for 39 daysInstalls 255Last detonated 49 min ago
$claude mcp add vgs-bc-mcp -- uvx vgs-bc-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BC_AUTH_MODEBC_CUSTOM_AUTH_HEADERBC_HIDE_UNAUTHORIZED_TOOLSBC_TOKEN_SCOPE or --customauthheader / --hideunauthorizedtools / --nohideunauthorizedtoolsConfiguration, not credentials: BC_ALLOW_COMPANY_SWITCH, BC_ALLOWED_COMPANIES, BC_ANNOTATE_TOOLS, BC_BASE_URL, BC_CLIENT_ID, BC_COMPANY, BC_CONFIGURATION_NAME, BC_DEVICE_CACHE_LOCATION, BC_DEVICE_CACHE_NAME, BC_ENVIRONMENT, BC_FORWARD_RESOURCES_PROMPTS, BC_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, BC_INITIAL_TOOLS_WAIT_SECONDS, BC_INSTRUCTIONS, BC_LOG_LEVEL, BC_SERVER_NAME, BC_SERVER_VERSION, BC_SSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, BC_TENANT_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoftonline.com, dynamics.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names microsoftonline.com, dynamics.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BC_AUTH_MODE, BC_CUSTOM_AUTH_HEADER, BC_HIDE_UNAUTHORIZED_TOOLS, BC_TOKEN_SCOPE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vgs-bc-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 11,367 lines in 51 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈81 tok
1 file · 51 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.