vexar-mcp@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Static analyzer, security scanner, schema validator, and token-budget auditor for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and AI agent tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso schemastore.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"(?i)(os\.environ|os\.getenv|getenv|process\.env|environ\b|vault:|"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.remediation="Use `subprocess.run([cmd, arg], shell=False, check=True)` with validated arguments.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Even read-mode open on unvalidated user paths can leak `/etc/passwd` or secretsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.containing a constant ``os.system("ls")`` would inherit that finding.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><strong>Scaffold a project in one command</strong></summary> ```bash vexar-mcp init . --policy strict-prod --github-action ``` Writes `vexar-mcp.toml` Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><strong>Developing on Vexar-MCP itself</strong></summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/RANJITHROSAN17/Vexar-MCP.git cd Vexar-MCP python3 -m venFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.drift, so it can never show output the tool does not produce.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ranjithrosan17: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.