verdict-qa-mcp@0.94.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Read-only MCP server and release gate over Verdict QA state: verdicts, findings, flaky quarantine, run history." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"method": ("measured before the gates: no plaintext .env file at "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# plaintext `.env` at the checkout root. With one there, a test run may reach live servicesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `~/.config/op-agent/service-account.token` and `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` are files anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""`.env.sops`, `secrets.enc.yaml`, `.env.vault` — but `vault.py` is code. A nameFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".ssh", ".gnupg", ".aws", ".azure", ".kube", ".docker", ".netrc", ".git-credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# carried every `.env` in the tree, and the module under probe imports its config onFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (suffix in _CODE_CLASS or suffix == ".sql" or name.startswith(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.SECRET_SKIP = (".env", ".env.*", "*.env", ".envrc", "*.pem", "*.key", "id_rsa*", ".ssh",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if name.endswith(suffixes) or (kind.startswith("configuration") and name.startswith(".env")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".netrc", ".npmrc", ".pypirc", ".gnupg", ".aws", ".git-credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".json", ".yml", ".yaml", ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg", ".env", ".properties", ".xml",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for pattern in ("*.env", "*.env.*", "*/*.env", "*/*.env.*"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.writable `~` cannot reopen `~/.ssh` (measured).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `~/.config/op-agent/service-account.token` and `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` are files anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* **No reads of the owner's credential stores** (`CREDENTIAL_PATHS`, plaintext `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""`.env*` files at the checkout root that are neither examples nor encrypted."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Once more, after the read-back: a writable `~` must not reopen `~/.ssh`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.the operator's privileges: `import os; os.system(...)` reads `~/.ssh` from a scratch asFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.writable `~` cannot reopen `~/.ssh` (measured).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""The plaintext `.env` files under `~/.config`, one level down too. Claude Code's `denyRead`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return (Path(name).suffix.lower() in SCANNED_SUFFIXES or name.startswith(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.the operator's privileges: `import os; os.system(...)` reads `~/.ssh` from a scratch asFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "show", f"{ref}:{rel}"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".claude.json", ".claude/.credentials.json", ".claude/settings.json",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.names = sorted(p.name for p in repo.iterdir() if p.name.startswith(".env") and p.is_file())Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".ini", ".cfg", ".conf", ".properties", ".env", ".lock",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if not (name.startswith(".env") and _ENV_TEMPLATE.search(name)) and not name.endswith(".env.example"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# followed it, so a link to `~/.aws/credentials` materialised the secret in the scratchFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.start: npx next start -p {port}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.redirected log grows in real time and survives a kill mid-run), and whenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.verdict-browse http://127.0.0.1:{port}/ --start "npx next start -p {port}" --repo .Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.count = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-list", "--count", sha_range],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "grep", "-o", "-E", pattern],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(cwd) if cwd else None, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(argv, cwd=cwd, env=env, shell=shell, stdout=out, stderr=err,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.it. A mutant those tests do not kill marks a line the suite executes and does not check — anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.head = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "--verify", f"{ref}^{{commit}}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "remote", "get-url", "origin"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.probe = subprocess.run([SANDBOX_EXEC, "-p", "(version 1)(allow default)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.head = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "ls-files"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "ls-tree", "-r", "--name-only", ref],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "log", "--format=%x1e%h%x1f%cs%x1f%s",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "worktree", "remove", "--force", str(scratch)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.The previous shape — `subprocess.run(capture_output=True)` — was a blackFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "diff", "--name-only", sha_range],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", str(process.pid)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, shell=shell, env=env, timeout=timeout,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "ls-files", "-z"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", _BOOT, src, sub, *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._proc = subprocess.Popen(["git", "-C", str(repo), "cat-file", "--batch"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "grep", "-n", "-I", "-F", "-e", token],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(command, **kwargs) # noqa: S602 - the profile's own commandFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, cwd=repo, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "ls-tree", "-r", "-l", "-z", "HEAD"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "worktree", "add", "--detach", str(scratch),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim artjack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.