Skills/PyPI/veo-mcp-server

veo-mcp-server@1.1.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for 4K video generation using Google VEO 3.1 -- text-to-video, image-to-video, video extension" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher u2n4 · publishing for 217 daysInstalls 458Last detonated 41 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEY_BACKUPConfiguration, not credentials: VIDEO_OUTPUT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GEMINI_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY_BACKUP and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx veo-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/veo_mcp_server/core/validation.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``~/.ssh/authorized_keys``, ``C:\\Windows\\System32\\...``).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/veo_mcp_server/core/validation.py:164 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Blocks writes to sensitive user dirs (``~/.ssh``, ``~/.aws``, ...).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/veo_mcp_server/core/validation.py:7 · References a credential file in the home directory``last_frame_path`` (e.g. exfiltrating ``~/.aws/credentials``).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/veo_mcp_server/core/validation.py:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_smoke.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/veo_mcp_server/core/validation.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``last_frame_path`` (e.g. exfiltrating ``~/.aws/credentials``).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_validation.py:55 · References a credential file in the home directoryvalidate_output_path("~/.aws/credentials.mp4")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_file_path("~/.ssh/id_rsa.png")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_smoke.py:83 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_validation.py:242 · References a credential file in the home directoryfirst_frame_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa.png",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_validation.py:108 · References a credential file in the home directoryvalidate_file_path("~/.ssh/id_rsa.png")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_file_path("../../etc/passwd.png")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_validation.py:173 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsvalidate_video_uri("https://169.254.169.254/metadata")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_output_path("~/.ssh/id_rsa.mp4")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_validation.py:50 · References a credential file in the home directoryvalidate_output_path("~/.ssh/id_rsa.mp4")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_validation.py:243 · References a credential file in the home directorylast_frame_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa.png",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_output_path("~/.aws/credentials.mp4")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_validation.py:179 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/v1beta/files/x"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_smoke.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_smoke.py:113 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_output_path("../../etc/passwd.mp4")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim u2n4: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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