Skills/PyPI/vdb-mcp

vdb-mcp@0.2.9

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for VDB — AI-aware vulnerability database (packages, MCP servers, models). Check packages for CVEs and slopsquatting before installing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher 0pstech · publishing for 125 daysInstalls 440Last detonated 18 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VDB_API_KEYVDB_API_TOKENVDB_PROXY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_MODE, MCP_PORT, UPSTREAM, VDB_API_ADDR, VDB_API_URL, VDB_CLIENT, VDB_GIT_SHA, VDB_HARDEN_TIMEOUT, VDB_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ai.kr — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ai.kr as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VDB_API_KEY, VDB_API_TOKEN, VDB_PROXY_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vdb-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.2.8

vet-skills diff vdb-mcp 0.2.8 0.2.9

This version reaches for something 0.2.8 did not: 1 new credential variable (VDB_PROXY_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New credential variables
VDB_PROXY_TOKEN

0.2.8 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detected# docker run -i --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:62 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://203.0.113.7/v1/auth/me"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:133 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert [c[1] for c in calls[1:]] == ["https://203.0.113.7/v1/auth/me",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:133 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert [c[1] for c in calls[1:]] == ["https://203.0.113.7/v1/auth/me",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_harden_remediate_tool.py:143 · Python subprocess execution detectedassert "subprocess.run(body" not in json.dumps(body)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:148 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert calls[1][1] == "https://203.0.113.7:8443/api/v1/auth/me"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_harden_remediate_tool.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detected" subprocess.run(body, shell=True)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedvdb_mcp/harden/cli.py:293 · OS command execution function call detected# os.system(cmd), eval(expr), pickle.loads(blob) with a tainted argument allFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:148 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert calls[1][1] == "https://203.0.113.7:8443/api/v1/auth/me"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:62 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://203.0.113.7/v1/auth/me"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationtests/test_http_bearer.py:58 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# request and forwards it to the API — only together with the proxy secret,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationvdb_mcp/server.py:842 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# the API only with the proxy secret (see _headers).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:21 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedvdb_mcp/harden/sinks.py:206 · Python subprocess execution detected# has no summary to chase — `subprocess.run(cmd)` in the user's handler — andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:134 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://203.0.113.8/v1/auth/me"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_pinned_fallback.py:134 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://203.0.113.8/v1/auth/me"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 0pstech: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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