Skills/PyPI/vaquill-mcp

vaquill-mcp@0.5.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Vaquill legal research API - search US federal and 50-state statutes, regulations, constitutions, and court rules via AI" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vaquill-ai · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 363Last detonated 34 min ago
$claude mcp add vaquill-mcp -- uvx vaquill-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE_TOKENVAQUILL_API_KEYVAQUILL_INTERNAL_SECRETVAQUILL_OAUTH_ALGORITHMVAQUILL_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URISVAQUILL_OAUTH_AUDIENCEVAQUILL_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URLVAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDVAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETVAQUILL_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLVAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_ISSUERVAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_JWKS_URIConfiguration, not credentials: VAQUILL_BASE_URL, VAQUILL_JURISDICTION, VAQUILL_PUBLIC_URL, VAQUILL_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
vaquill.ai (its own)Also claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE_TOKEN, VAQUILL_API_KEY, VAQUILL_INTERNAL_SECRET, VAQUILL_OAUTH_ALGORITHM, VAQUILL_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS, VAQUILL_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, VAQUILL_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL, VAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, VAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, VAQUILL_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL, VAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_ISSUER, VAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_JWKS_URI only into requests to vaquill.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=vaquill.ai,OPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE_TOKEN=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_API_KEY=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_INTERNAL_SECRET=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_ALGORITHM=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_AUDIENCE=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_ISSUER=vaquill.ai,VAQUILL_OAUTH_UPSTREAM_JWKS_URI=vaquill.ai -- uvx vaquill-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:43 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /tmp/* /var/tmp/* /root/.cacheFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_registration_guard.py:112 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert r.json()["n"] == len(httpx.Request("POST", "http://x", json=payload).content)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/vaquill_mcp/tribunals_main.py:107 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tribunals_tools.py:450 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_FORUM, "../../etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmonkeypatch.setenv("VAQUILL_BASE_URL", "file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# `set -a` exports everything sourced from .env, then `exec` replaces the shellFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tribunals_tools.py:386 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("cat_cis", "../../../etc/passwd"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Dokploy writes the app's saved environment variables to `.env` in the buildFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:69 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /data && chown 65532:65532 /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/measure_tool_tokens.py:133 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn response.json()["input_tokens"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The trailing `*` keeps the build working on a machine with no .env (localFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCOPY --chown=65532:65532 .env* ./Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tribunals_tools.py:453 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files) or "/" not in _file_name(_FORUM, "../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/vaquill_mcp/regulatory_main.py:117 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/vaquill_mcp/remote_main.py:179 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:107 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# environment variables and no .env behaves identically.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_regulatory_remote.py:416 · Dynamic module loadingspec = importlib.util.find_spec(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.