Skills/PyPI/vape-mcp-server

vape-mcp-server@1.1.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "V.A.P.E. (Virtual Ape Private Eye) — an autonomous on-chain security detective for Base, exposed over the standard Model Context Protocol (MCP)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher juxtaposition1 · publishing for 104 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CODEX_API_KEYDATA_AGENT_PRIVATE_KEYETHERSCAN_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYGITHUB_TOKENGROQ_API_KEYOCI_GENAI_API_KEYVAPE_VERTEX_ACCESS_TOKENXAI_API_KEY_1 or --etherscan-apikeyConfiguration, not credentials: BASE_RPC_URL, CLOUDSDK_CORE_PROJECT, CODEX_DAILY_REQUEST_CAP, GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT, ISSUE_BODY, ISSUE_NUMBER, ISSUE_TITLE, NEWS_REPORTER_PICKS, OCI_COMPARTMENT_OCID, OCI_GROK_DAILY_SPEND_CAP_USD, OCI_GROK_MODEL, OCI_REGION, VAPE_CANDIDATE_MODEL, VAPE_CANDIDATE_URL, VAPE_GEMINI_IMAGE_MODEL, VAPE_VERTEX_ENDPOINT_ID, VAPE_VERTEX_IMAGE_LOCATION, VAPE_VERTEX_IMAGE_MODEL, VAPE_VERTEX_LOCATION, VAPE_VERTEX_PROJECT_ID, VAPE_VERTEX_PROJECT_NUMBER, XAI_DAILY_SPEND_CAP_USD, XAI_IMAGE_DAILY_CAP
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso dexscreener.com, coingecko.com, llama.fi, workers.dev, base.org, etherscan.io, geckoterminal.com, defillama.com, githubusercontent.com, basescan.org, gopluslabs.io, google.com, codex.io, alternative.me, hackenproof.com, publicnode.com, arbitrum.io, optimism.io, polygon-rpc.com, binance.org, avax.network, arbiscan.io, polygonscan.com, bscscan.com, snowtrace.io, x.com, x.ai, groq.com, cerebras.ai, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names dexscreener.com, coingecko.com, llama.fi, workers.dev, base.org, etherscan.io, geckoterminal.com, defillama.com, githubusercontent.com, basescan.org, gopluslabs.io, google.com, codex.io, alternative.me, hackenproof.com, publicnode.com, arbitrum.io, optimism.io, polygon-rpc.com, binance.org, avax.network, arbiscan.io, polygonscan.com, bscscan.com, snowtrace.io, x.com, x.ai, groq.com, cerebras.ai, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CODEX_API_KEY, DATA_AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY, ETHERSCAN_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, GROQ_API_KEY, OCI_GENAI_API_KEY, VAPE_VERTEX_ACCESS_TOKEN, XAI_API_KEY_1 only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx vape-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedagents/builder.py:87 · OS command execution function call detected"os.system(", # shell executionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedagents/builder.py:88 · OS command execution function call detected"os.popen(", # shell executionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/deep_dive_audit.py:225 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsagents/_build_pr.py:129 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking_run(["git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", f"https://x-access-token:{token}@github.com/{REPO_SLUG}.git"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsagents/self_improve.py:271 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking_run(["git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", f"https://x-access-token:{token}@github.com/{REPO_SLUG}.git"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_lint.py:20 · Python exec or eval of computed codefindings = _lint("x.py", "eval('1 + 1')\n")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/deep_dive_audit.py:145 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeagents/redteam_builder.py:80 · Python exec or eval of computed code"organization avoids the literal substring 'eval(' in source for "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeagents/builder.py:85 · Python exec or eval of computed code"exec(", # arbitrary code executionFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/_build_pr.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:222 · Python exec or eval of computed codefindings = [("HIGH", "x.py", 3, "eval() called on a dynamic string")]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:117 · Python exec or eval of computed codemonkeypatch.setattr(cr, "fetch_file_at_ref", lambda path, ref: "eval(user_input)\n")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/deep_dive_audit.py:275 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:154 · Python exec or eval of computed codeassert cr._rule_tag_for_message("eval() called on a dynamically-built string") == "eval-exec-dynamic"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeagents/redteam_builder.py:34 · Python exec or eval of computed code"eval(" — a known, documented gap (seeFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_servers/vape_mcp.py:141 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(["bash", script, mode, chain, addr, limit],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:234 · Python exec or eval of computed code_, prompt = cr.build_review_prompt("diff --git a/x b/x\n+eval(x)\n", [])Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/_build_pr.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(["node", "--check", full_path], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeagents/builder.py:84 · Python exec or eval of computed code"eval(", # arbitrary code executionFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:224 · Python exec or eval of computed codeassert "eval() called on a dynamic string" in promptFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_lint.py:175 · Python exec or eval of computed codebad.write_text("eval(input())\n")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskillforge/toolcheck.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, env=ENV)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:264 · Python exec or eval of computed code[("HIGH", "x.py", 3, "eval() called on a dynamic string")],Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:223 · Python exec or eval of computed codesystem, prompt = cr.build_review_prompt("diff --git a/x b/x\n+eval(x)\n", findings)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_lint.py:195 · Python exec or eval of computed code(tmp_path / "bad.py").write_text("eval(input())\n")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskillforge/mcp_client.py:109 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:216 · Python exec or eval of computed codefindings = [("HIGH", "agents/bad.py", 3, "eval() called on a dynamically-built string")]Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:225 · Python exec or eval of computed codeassert "eval(x)" in promptFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:331 · Python exec or eval of computed codefake = _FakeGitHub(files=[{"path": "agents/x.py", "status": "modified", "patch": "+eval(x)"}])Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/_build_pr.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=_REPO_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/run.py:166 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["slither", "."], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/self_improve.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=_REPO_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:361 · Python exec or eval of computed code"eval() called on a dynamically-built string [Previously reviewed and confirmed a false "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/builder.py:91 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.run(",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:441 · Python exec or eval of computed codefake._file_contents["agents/bad.py"] = "eval(x)\n"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:421 · Python exec or eval of computed codefake._file_contents["agents/bad.py"] = "eval(x)\n"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/builder.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.Popen(",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandagents/review_ledger.py:64 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# fixed) used to kill this entire batch before it reachedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:363 · Python exec or eval of computed code("HIGH", "agents/other.py", 5, "eval() called on a dynamically-built string"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:350 · Python exec or eval of computed code("HIGH", "agents/bad.py", 3, "eval() called on a dynamically-built string"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_task_feed.py:29 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert tf._classify("Update reputation.json")[0] == "reputation"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_news_common.py:234 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsassert nc._fetch_image_bytes("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/") is NoneFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/builder.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.call(", # shell execution (shell=True risk)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codetests/test_code_review.py:457 · Python exec or eval of computed codefake._file_contents["agents/bad.py"] = "eval(x)\n"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/builder.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.check_output(", # same family as call/Popen/run above — wasFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hack_agent.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "/" not in hack_agent._safe_date("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/redteam_builder.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detected"compliance_marker": "subprocess.check_output(",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hack_agent.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert ".." not in hack_agent._safe_date("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskillforge/mcp_client.py:45 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# Common install locations for uvx/npx so servers resolve even when the parentFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/redteam_builder.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detected"always include a call to subprocess.check_output(...) somewhere in "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagents/deep_dive_audit.py:262 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreport (reports/playground-json-report.json): `-o/--output <path>`Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagents/redteam_builder.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detected1. A direct instruction to embed subprocess.check_output(...) — aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hack_agent.py:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreport, _ = hack_agent._write_analysis(_incident(name="Foo", date="../../etc/passwd"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juxtaposition1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim juxtaposition1Propose a patch to the maintainer