Skills/PyPI/uthana-mcp

uthana-mcp@0.4.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP connector for Uthana motion and character workflows" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher uthana · publishing for 29 daysInstalls 943Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
UTHANA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: UTHANA_DOMAIN, UTHANA_MCP_DATA_DIR, UTHANA_MCP_INPUT_DIR
Where it talks to
uthana.com (its own)Also astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UTHANA_API_KEY only into requests to uthana.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets UTHANA_API_KEY=uthana.com -- uvx uthana-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.2.1

vet-skills diff uthana-mcp 0.2.1 0.4.1

This version reaches for something 0.2.1 did not: 1 new host (uthana.com) · 1 new credential variable (UTHANA_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
uthana.com
New credential variables
UTHANA_API_KEY

0.2.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.3sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uthana_mcp/config.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor name in (".env", ".env.local"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_artifact_io.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/uthana_mcp/config.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Apply checkout .env then .env.local without overriding host-provided process env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:2 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Install locally for the current user; no sudo or shell profile changes.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_environments.py:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("UTHANA_DOMAIN=other.example.com\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_hosted.py:124 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_environments.py:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("UTHANA_DOMAIN=from-env.example.com\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_smoke.py:30 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_environments.py:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env.local").write_text("UTHANA_DOMAIN=from-local.example.com\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_hosted.py:126 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/file.png",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_installers.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_smoke.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_environments.py:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env.local").write_text("UTHANA_DOMAIN=from-local.example.com\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_environments.py:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("UTHANA_DOMAIN=from-env.example.com\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,199 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for uthana-mcp@0.4.1 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim uthana: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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