utcp-mcp@1.2.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "UTCP communication protocol plugin for interoperability with the Model Context Protocol (MCP)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CLIENT_SECRET- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CLIENT_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
name="m", config=McpConfig(mcpServers={"s": {"url": "http://evil.example/mcp"}})Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.name="m", config=McpConfig(mcpServers={"s": {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp"}})Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.config=McpConfig(mcpServers={HTTP_SERVER_NAME: server_config})Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.mcpServers={"s": {"url": "https://mcp.example.com", "auth": {"kind": "custom"}}}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.config=McpConfig(mcpServers={"s": {"url": "https://mcp.example.com"}}),Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.mcpServers={"s": {"url": "https://mcp.example.com", "auth_token": "own"}}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for utcp-mcp@1.2.0 as of 8 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.